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Abstract 
This paper uses international evidence to assess the impact of tripartism and other forms of 
government involvement in bargaining on wage moderation and wage dispersion.  We find 
that government involvement in wage bargaining leads to a modest increase in wage 
moderation and reduction in wage dispersion.  Historic differences in bargaining institutions 
between countries have greater moderating effects. 
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Introduction 
Understanding how labour market institutions affect pay and employment outcomes is of long-
standing interest to social scientists and policymakers.  A major point of discussion has been the 
role of bargaining institutions in bringing about wage moderation and shaping the distribution of 
                                                          

 Corresponding author: Marian Rizov, Business School, Middlesex University, London NW4 4BT. 
M.rizov@mdx.ac.uk. 
2 
 
earnings since the Second World War.  Economic historians have argued that post-war 
arrangements facilitated wage moderation that fostered investment in productivity-enhancing 
mass production techniques.
1
  The extent of wage moderation, and critically, the depth of explicit 
government involvement in the bargaining process, varied significantly both between and within 
national economies, as the European post-war consensus eroded through the 1970s and 1980s, 
and new social pacts emerged in Ireland, the Netherlands, and other economies in subsequent 
decades.
2
 
Economists have offered several assessments of the relationship between bargaining 
structure and economic performance.
3
 This literature has mainly focused on the impact of the 
“centralisation” of bargaining on economic outcomes – whether negotiations take place at a 
“local” level, or between national unions and employer organizations.  Scholars of industrial 
relations have identified a crucial shortcoming in this literature – the theoretical and empirical 
work to date has done little to disentangle the effects of different approaches used to target wage 
moderation.  This is a particularly important issue when considering different bargaining 
practices and the changes in the macroeconomic environment facing negotiators in recent 
decades relative to the Golden Age of the 1960s and early 70s.
4
  States have differed in the roles 
played by three interest groups in negotiations over wages and working conditions: worker 
organizations (i.e. unions), employer organizations, and government.  The early empirical 
literature on the effects of centralised or “corporatist” wage setting institutions paid little 
attention to how differences in the roles of these three groups of actors may or may not have 
impacted upon economic outcomes.
5
  Writings on comparative industrial relations suggest that 
direct government involvement may lead unions and employer organizations to accept wage 
bargains that would not arise through bilateral negotiations.
6
  The presence of government as an 
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agent at the bargaining table could also serve as a device to encourage coordinated wage setting 
in the absence of highly centralised unions and employer organisations.   
There is little direct evidence, however, on whether tripartism or other forms of 
government intervention in wage setting has actually led to wage moderation in recent decades.  
Wallerstein demonstrates that centralised wage bargaining correlates with pay inequality, but 
offers only a limited exploration of the detailed differences in bargaining institutions.
7
  Recent 
studies by Franz Traxler and Bernd Brandl have brought together a simple econometric 
framework with cross-country panel data to provide more explicit consideration of the role of 
bargaining institutions across countries and over time.
8
  This literature, however, has left several 
important questions unanswered.  Research by Brandl with a more explicit focus on bargaining 
regimes has mainly looked at their effects on wage levels and labour costs, rather than the key 
dimensions of wage moderation and wage dispersion.  A further issue is methodological: one 
would like to separate out the effects of bargaining state from country fixed effects, but this is 
made difficult by the slow evolution of bargaining regimes within countries.  Finally, the focus 
on current institutions in explaining outcomes since 1970 has largely ignored the potentially 
persistent effects of cross-country differences in labour market institutions from earlier decades.  
Economic historians have debated the extent to which both industrial relations schemes and 
national wage and employment structures have deep historical roots, and studies to date have not 
attempted to quantify how the influence of past institutions on current norms and informal 
institutions compares to the effect of present-day formal institutions.   
In this paper we use cross-country evidence to re-evaluate the influence of bargaining 
arrangements on post-1970 labour market outcomes.  We focus on the effects of bargaining 
institutions on wage moderation and wage dispersion, which allows our results to speak to the 
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debate between Eichengreen and co-authors, who argued that new bargaining methods led to 
wage moderation, versus scholars of industrial relations who claimed that centralised unions 
were able to secure larger wage increases for their members.  Our analysis focuses on the role of 
government in the bargaining process, particularly through tripartite arrangements leading to 
negotiated social pacts.  We develop a methodology that allows us to control for country fixed 
effects appropriately in the presence of slowly evolving bargaining states.  Our findings show 
that government involvement in the wage bargaining process has a small, but statistically 
significant role in generating wage moderation and reduced wage dispersion.  We also find that 
history mattered: bargaining institutions from the immediate post-war settlement continue to 
shape wage moderation and wage dispersion long after countries had shifted institutional 
regimes.    
 
Bargaining regimes and labour market outcomes: theory, evidence, and history 
Economic theory offers several arguments as to how the relative centralization of bargaining 
may affect wage outcomes.  High level (often national) unions and employer organisations may 
internalize inter-firm or inter-industry tradeoffs that are external to negotiating parties under 
fragmented bargaining.  Once wages are agreed, the centralised nature of labour market 
institutions is key to achieving wage moderation, by preventing shirking on agreements by either 
workers or firms.  On the other hand, decentralised bargaining may bring about greater wage 
discipline in unions for whom higher wages will reduce demand for labour in the firms in which 
they are active.  A further counterpoint is that centralised unions may be able to secure higher 
wage settlements if the effect of collective arrangements is mainly to increase the bargaining 
power of organised labour.   
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Consistent with these opposing forces, Calmfors and Driffil argue for a U-shaped 
relationship between economic performance and the centralisation, with the effects of 
internalised spillovers in wage bargaining and fragmented union discipline dominating the tails 
of the bargaining distribution.
9
  Some empirical studies find evidence of a relationship between 
centralisation of bargaining and economic performance, through greater employment, moderated 
wage growth, and relative wage equalisation (Bruno and Sachs; Layard, Nickell and Jackman; 
Wallerstein), while others report ambiguous effects (OECD; Flanagan).
10
   
A significant issue in this literature is how centralised or so-called “corporatist” 
bargaining is measured.  Most follow Calmfors and Driffil by ranking countries on an index of 
centralisation of bargaining, based primarily on the “level” at which negotiations take place.11  
Early studies typically based this measure on union structure - countries in which unions are 
mainly firm-specific rank as decentralised, while states with national confederations of unions 
are centralised.  SOSKICE was among the first to observe that centralisation as measured does 
not necessarily overlap with the coordination of wage setting.
12
 In the 1980s (and indeed in 
subsequent decades as well), several states with “decentralised” firm-level bargaining according 
to Calmfors and Driffil actually feature high levels of wage coordination, due to the role of 
employer organizations, union governance, or links between bargaining partners and the 
government.
13
   
The last point is of particular interest here, as many industrial relations scholars have 
suggested that tripartite models which introduce the government as a bargaining partner could 
promote moderation and compression of the earnings distribution.  Several reasons have been 
offered to support this prediction.  Unions may agree to lower wage increases in exchange of  
concessions that are credible only when government is at the bargaining table.
14
  Others argue 
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that revised tripartist models of wage moderation result from the implicit threat that if unions do 
not engage in negotiation on terms favoured by the government, tight monetary policy and 
austerity would result in high unemployment in the short term, with reduced wage settlements 
following in the longer run.
15
  A further possibility is that tripartism might be the device that 
provides wage coordination in the absences of national-level unions and employer organisations.  
Soskice suggests that guidance from central government encourages wage coordination in Japan; 
in the Singaporean case, an explicitly tripartite bargaining structure is inserted into a framework 
of relatively decentralised unions and employers.
16
  Other scholars have been sceptical of the 
ability of tripartite bargaining approaches to shift labour market outcomes.  The ability of 
governments to transmit their intentions to labour market outcomes depends on the aptitude of 
government negotiators, their ability to successfully influence proceedings, and whether it is 
feasible to target real economic outcomes under uncertainty through an indirect mechanism such 
as wage bargaining.  Democratically elected governments work within limited time horizons, 
dampening incentives to achieve moderation versus political economy considerations related to 
the electorate.  Further, the emergence of tripartism or other models of consensual bargaining 
may occur at lower cost in some countries than in others.
17
   
Empirical evidence regarding the importance of government involvement bargaining in 
explaining cross-country outcomes is limited.  When separating government involvement from 
other institutional features of wage bargaining, Wallerstein found little support for the 
importance of government involvement, with the level of wage-setting dominating other 
measures of centralization.
18
  More recent research by Brandl finds empirical support for the 
notion that government intervention in wage bargaining has a substantial influence on nominal 
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wages and labour costs, but he limits attention to developments post-1980, and the results do not 
speak directly to classic debates regarding wage moderation.
19
 
A historical perspective may be necessary to develop a fuller understanding of the 
connection between bargaining arrangements and labour market outcomes.  Flanagan asks 
whether patterns of negotiated wage settlements have more to do with national differences in 
culture and social norms, which themselves structure bargaining arrangements.
20
 Informal 
institutions or norms often have deep historical roots, which shape both the nature of formal 
institutions, and how those institutions are used to generate outcomes in the labour market and 
elsewhere.  There may also be connections between past policy arrangements and current 
performance, with arrangements introduced in previous decades influencing current economic 
outcomes above and beyond any effects due to path dependency in the policy framework.  Maier 
observes that both organised labour and (some) industrial capitalists saw advantages in publicly 
regulated wage negotiations prior to the First World War, and the impetus of wartime 
mobilization and economic dislocation during the 1920s and 1930s saw the emergence of early 
wage bargaining regimes that informed discussions after the Second World War.
21
  This view is 
supported by earlier work by Panitch, who connected the rise or post-war corporatism to the 
rising importance of full employment as a macroeconomic objective, particularly in light of the 
experience of mass unemployment of the 1930s.
22
  Early examples of successful social compacts 
(including widespread wage controls) are seen in smaller nation-states (particularly in 
Scandinavia), for which export production was key to economic performance, and where social 
democratic parties generally had a presence prior to 1945.
23
  In West Germany, organised labour 
accepted wage restraint due to the primacy of reconstruction and post-war recovery that was in 
the interest of their members in the longer term.  In short, the above explanations suggest that 
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there may be a link between historical events and current labour market outcomes.  In a related 
context, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen argue that slow growth and economic 
volatility have more to do with deep historically generated institutions than current 
macroeconomic policy arrangements.
24
 It is an open question whether similar patterns might 
exist in terms of national wage structures in the face of the rise and fall of a host of wage 
bargaining arrangements.   
The theory and evidence on bargaining coordination with and without direct government 
involvement suggest two testable hypotheses regarding the effect of bargaining institutions on 
wage settlements.  First, (H1) if the coordination inspired by tripartite bargaining fosters wage 
moderation through the channels identified above, then one would hypothesise that state 
differences in government involvement in bargaining arrangements translate into state 
differences in wage moderation.  If government participation in bargaining causes negotiators to 
account for inter-sectoral tradeoffs, it should also affect the wage dispersion between sectors in 
countries where tripartite arrangements are present.  Second, and as argued earlier, current 
institutions may not be the end of the story.  Norms and informal institutions related to historic 
bargaining systems may also affect current outcomes.  A second hypothesis, therefore, emerges 
from the question of whether current labour market outcomes, in terms of wage moderation and 
wage dispersion, are affected by the historical legacy of the post-war settlement.  Here the 
hypothesis (H2) is that “history mattered”, with the test being whether states adopting more 
centralised bargaining regimes in the decades after the Second World War experiencing greater 
wage moderation and reduced wage dispersion from 1969 onwards.  In the work that follows, we 
test the first hypothesis in some detail, and provide some exploratory empirical evidence to 
9 
 
answer the second question.  The results of this investigation also allow for an explicit 
comparison between the effects of current institutions and prior institutional arrangements. 
 
Labour market outcomes and bargaining arrangements, 1969-2008: the data 
We use contemporary evidence on wages and labour market institutions to evaluate the impact of 
bargaining arrangements on international labour markets.  Our key indicators on labour market 
institutions are drawn from Visser, who provides cross-country evidence on the relative 
centralisation of bargaining, the role of government in wage setting, and the degree of 
centralisation and other wage rigidities in each nation state.
25
  Crucially for our analysis, the 
database captures both cross-sectional variation between countries and inter-temporal variation 
within countries over time.  The wage bargaining information identifies major changes in 
national bargaining institutions over time, such as the examples of Ireland and the Netherlands 
discussed above.
26
 Comparable international wage data is drawn from the databases of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO).  The ILO database provides wages for up to 10 sectors 
for most of the countries also covered by the labour market institutions database.  Finally, to 
allow for an examination of trends in wage growth relative to productivity (a key point in any 
arguments regarding moderation, see Baccaro and Simoni 
27
), we use statistical evidence on 
aggregate labour productivity from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) 10-
sector database.
28
  The data and sources used are described in further detail in the Appendix. 
We focus on explaining two outcome measures that are in keeping with the existing 
(theoretical) literature on bargaining institutions.  The first is the (real) wage-productivity gap, 
which we take as the ratio between wages and output per worker.  This measure has obvious 
links to ideas regarding economic efficiency, as well as to the classic debate on wage moderation 
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– if workers are accepting smaller wage increases so that firms can invest excess profits, this 
ratio should be smaller.  The second outcome we examine is wage dispersion.  Greater equity in 
wage outcomes is often an explicit aim of the actors engaged in wage negotiations, and ideally 
our results would speak to whether or not particular bargaining arrangements tend to achieve this 
aim.  To compute the wage-productivity gap, we use sector-level wages for all countries and all 
years for which we have labour market data and evidence on bargaining institutions (as outlined 
below), and divide these by national output per unit of labour.
29
 We use the standard deviation of 
the sectoral wage observations in the country in each year as our wage dispersion measure.
30
 The 
wage data used refer to ILO series that combine male and female workers.  We have much wider 
country coverage in observations that combine both genders than for only male or only female 
workers, but the data suggest similar patterns (and in particular similar regression results) if we 
extend coverage to all available data.   
Table 1 summarizes wage and labour productivity statistics for the 22 countries included 
in our sample.  The summary statistics for the spread of earnings from the ILO data are well in 
line with other estimates of the earned income distribution for these countries.  In terms of real 
hourly wages and output, Canada, Denmark, Netherland, Norway, and Switzerland are near the 
top of the rankings, with Greece, Portugal, Singapore, and Israel located near the bottom.  These 
figures do not account for changes in wages over time, differences in sectoral composition 
between countries, and the timing of any missing observations.  Canada, Great Britain, and the 
United States exhibit relatively high wage dispersion, while Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and 
the Nordic economies are towards the other end of the spectrum.   
(Table 1) 
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We generate a series of contemporary wage bargaining categories based on two of 
Visser’s variables as bargaining dimensions: first, the extent of government involvement in wage 
negotiations (government imposes wage settlements, tripartist negotiations, indirect government 
involvement, no government involvement) and second, the level at which most wage bargaining 
occurs (national, industry-level, or local).
31
  As the wage data we use is not disaggregated within 
sectors and we cannot separate industry from firm (local) level effects, we focus mainly on 
differences between national bargaining relative to the alternatives.  Furthermore, considering 
the importance and sensitivity of bargaining arrangements measures discussed in the literature, 
we pay special attention to the government involvement dimension.  We use Mokken’s 
nonparametric scaling model to compute a synthetic index of item scores (by level of 
government involvement) forming a scale with the highest possible Loevinger’s H-coefficient of 
homogeneity as the primary scaling criterion.
32
  The threshold value for the H-coefficient is 0.30 
and higher values indicate a strong scale.  We find that a scale with three categories (government 
imposes wage settlements, tripartist negotiations, and indirect or no government involvement) 
performs the best with H=0.49 while the reliability of the scale as measured by Cronbach’s 
Alpha is 0.72, above the threshold of 0.70.  Based on this sensitivity analysis and taking into 
account the information available in Visser’s codebook we select a set of three dummy variables 
(government imposed wages, tripartist negotiations, and indirect or no government involvement) 
to measure government involvement in wage setting and a dummy variable (national level 
bargaining vs. the alternatives) to control for the level at which wage bargaining occurs.  
We also use data on historic bargaining institutions from Allard and Lindert.
33
  This 
consists of a single national indicator related to bargaining coordination (corporatism index) 
from the immediate post-war period, between 1950 and 1960.  Historic bargaining arrangements 
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might be used as an instrument for current bargaining state if the researcher is worried that the 
second of these is endogenous, but a more compelling argument is that, as discussed earlier in 
this paper, the regimes enacted following the end of the Second World War have long-term 
effects.  The new institutions introduced after the deep shocks of the Second World War may 
have long-run effects on norms and informal institutions that take several generations to fade 
from public practice.  A second possibility is that bargaining arrangements circa 1950 reflect 
long-run differences in formal or informal institutions prior to the Second World War that are 
likely to have persistent effects.  Summary statistics for national bargaining regimes are provided 
in the Appendix, Table A1.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics of wage and productivity trends by bargaining state 
using our preferred measures.  The top panel of the table shows clear differences in wages and 
wage dispersion depending on the relative centralisation of wage bargaining.  National-level 
bargaining produces smaller (sectoral) wage gaps than bargaining focused at industry or local 
levels.  This pattern is well in line with existing theories related to the internalisation of cross-
sectoral spillovers in the bargaining process when bargaining occurs at the national level.  
Differences in real wages and productivity are similarly associated with the level of bargaining.  
Real hourly wages and labour productivity are lower where national-level bargaining exists, but 
the relationship with the wage-productivity gap is the opposite.  We also find differences in wage 
dispersion for different levels of government involvement in the bargaining process.  Dispersion 
is greatest when the government plays no direct role in bargaining, falling significantly when 
government becomes active partners in determining wage outcomes.  While the ranking in wages 
and productivity by extent of government intervention is less obvious, the pattern for the wage-
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productivity gap suggests that the intermediate category of government involvement, in tripartite 
negotiations, delivers the most wage moderation.  
(Table 2)  
 
Statistical methodology and estimation results 
We develop statistical models to explore four research questions linked to the two hypotheses 
outlined earlier.  The first two questions relate to the effects of current bargaining arrangements 
(H1): 
a) Were cross-country differences in government involvement in bargaining associated with 
differences in wage moderation between 1969 and 2008? 
b) Were cross-country differences in government involvement in bargaining associated with 
differences in wage dispersion between 1969 and 2008? 
The next two questions evaluate the hypothesis regarding historical institutions and current wage 
outcomes (H2): 
c) Did post-Second World War bargaining arrangements have long-term effects on wage 
moderation that persist into the period between 1969 and 2008? 
d) Did post-Second World War bargaining arrangements have long-term effects on wage 
dispersion that persist into the period between 1969 and 2008? 
To answer questions a) and b), we estimate a series of regressions linking wage outcomes 
to bargaining arrangements.  In regressions explaining wage moderation, the model takes the 
following form: 
                                             (1) 
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In equation (1), Yijt is the labour market outcome of interest observed in country i, sector j, and 
year t.  On the right-hand side, we include a constant term (β0), a time trend (t), and indicator for 
national level bargaining (Nit), a vector of government involvement states (Zit) – as with 
bargaining, these are common across sectors, sets of dummies for sector (sj) and country (ci), a 
set of dummies for the original unit of pay 
34
 (uijt) which varies across sectors in some countries, 
and a vector of other national, time-varying controls (Xit).
35
  Our main interest in the baseline 
regression in (1) is the sign and magnitude of the coefficients β2 and γ measuring the effects of 
bargaining states N and Z.  In accordance with our research questions, and consistent with much 
of the existing literature, we focus on the effects of bargaining regimes on two direct measures of 
labour market outcomes associated respectively with notions of moderation – the wage-
productivity gap, and equity - the dispersion of real hourly wages.  In the model of wage 
dispersion, the dependent variable becomes Yit, as dispersion is the observed standard deviation 
among the industry wages in each country/year cell.   
The discussion in previous sections illustrated how we might expect both differences in 
bargaining regimes and differences in country-specific institutions to cause differences in labour 
market outcomes.  We adopt a simple empirical strategy to distinguish between these two 
sources of differences in labour market outcomes.  Based on annual industry - country 
observations we employ TSCS (time-series and cross-section) techniques.  The estimation is 
complicated because of the nature of the main variables of interest in our analysis – the 
bargaining regime dummies (H and Z) - that have little within-country variance and show much 
more variation across countries than over time.  The fixed country effects are likely to soak up 
most of the explanatory power of the slowly changing bargaining regime indicators.  This 
aggravates the inefficiency of the fixed effects estimator and may lead to unreliable point 
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estimates that would then lead to incorrect inferences in the same way that a biased estimator 
could.  Therefore, we employ four estimators to identify and address possible biases: pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), 
and Hausman-Taylor (HT).
36
  In the Appendix we discuss in detail the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of the estimators employed.  
For questions c) and d), we extend the Hausman-Taylor estimation of equation (1) for 
wage moderation (and similarly when explaining wage dispersion) with the addition of a 
measure of historical bargaining institutions (the corporatism index): 
                                                   (2), 
where Hi refers to historic bargaining institutions and  is the effect of these institutions on 
current outcomes, all else equal.  RNit and RZit are residuals estimated from auxiliary regressions 
following ideas in Plümper and Troeger where we decompose the contemporary bargaining 
regime indicators total effects into a fixed (historic) effect and a time-varying policy innovation 
effect, captured by the residuals.
37
  Results from the auxiliary regressions are reported in the 
Appendix, Table A2.  
(Table 3) 
Table 3 presents regression results linking the wage-productivity gap to bargaining state.  
We also include controls for national income (in the form of GDP per capita in ‘000 PPP 
Dollars), a time trend, and the salary or wage unit used in the original source data.
38
  The OLS 
specification in column (1) shows significant differences in the wage-productivity gap associated 
with bargaining regimes.  Consistent with the summary statistics in Table 2, tripartite 
arrangements are associated with significant wage moderation.  The sign on the coefficient for 
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government imposed wage settlements is also negative, but is small in magnitude and falls well 
short of statistical significance.  We also find little effect here of the level of bargaining, which 
has a positive sign but is estimated imprecisely.  Many of the states with some form of 
government involvement in wage negotiations also have national-level bargaining, so this pattern 
of coefficients mainly reveals that level of negotiations has little additional effect - once 
government actors are part of the process they serve as the primary coordinating device.  The 
results see reduction in coefficient magnitude in column (2), where we estimate a fixed-effects 
(FE) model with controls for sector and country.  The coefficient on tripartism is reduced by 
about one half, but it remains statistically significant at the one percent level.  This pattern 
continues in the random-effects (RE) regressions shown in column (3).  The results are 
consistent with our discussion on the characteristics of the estimation methods employed.  Thus 
the OLS estimates in column (1) represent the upper bound of the magnitude of the effects of 
interest while the FE (and RE) models generate more conservative estimates forming the lower 
bound.  The final model in Table 3 is the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator, in which bargaining 
states are treated as potentially endogenous time-varying regressors.  Reassuringly, the results 
are quite similar to what we find in the other specifications - in particular, the coefficient on the 
effect of tripartite bargaining remains significant and of a similar order of magnitude.  
Furthermore, the Hausman specification test yields values of around 2 and do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments and the fixed effects are uncorrelated.
39
  
(Table 4) 
Table 4 presents results from a similar series of regression models, with national wage 
dispersion as the dependent variable.  The OLS specification without country controls (column 
1) shows large differences among bargaining regimes.  Countries with government imposed 
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wage settlements have much less wage dispersion than elsewhere, however tripartism is not 
associated with significantly more wage compression than more liberal bargaining regimes.  The 
addition of country fixed effects has little impact on the coefficient on government imposed 
wage outcomes which remains statistically significant.  The results from the RE model also show 
that there is little between-variation left once we add the country controls; thus, the RE results 
can be considered equivalent to the OLS results with country controls.  The pattern persists 
through to the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimates, where the coefficient on tripartite negotiations 
has a similar magnitude to the fixed and random effects models, and is just short of statistical 
significance with a t-statistic of about 1.5.  A further interesting result is that national level 
bargaining does not appear to lead to reduced wage dispersion in the models in columns 1 to 4.
40
   
(Table 5) 
The results presented thus far show that current bargaining regimes do matter for wage 
moderation, a finding that persists after a range of approaches to control for (unobserved) 
institutional effects and the possible endogeneity of the bargaining regimes.  For wage 
dispersion, we find that tripartite models do not have as clear an effect, suggesting that the 
influence of government in negotiations is more often to suppress the level of overall wage 
growth, rather than to target different sectors based on current levels of pay.  In Table 5, we 
extend our baseline models to directly explore the role of historical institutions in shaping labour 
market outcomes in the present day.  We estimate equation (2) introduced earlier using the 
Hausman-Taylor methodology, which allows us to contrast the effects of historic wage 
coordination measures from 1950s with the effects of contemporary bargaining regimes.  
Following ideas set out by Plümper and Troeger, we use the residuals estimated from auxiliary 
regressions of present bargaining regime on the historical (time invariant) coordination indicator 
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as the right-hand side variable to capture the effects of time-varying changes (innovation) in 
national bargaining institutions beyond the impact of their historic predecesors.
41
  This approach 
yields two main findings.  First, the marginal effects of government involvement in wage setting 
(tripartism or government imposing wages, respectively) are much as we found in earlier models 
that control for country and industry factors through fixed effects and other approaches, and 
these coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.  Second, we find large, significant effects 
of historic wage coordination, which dominates the impact of current bargaining institutions.  
These results suggest that both current bargaining regimes and historical institutions matter in 
understanding international differences in wage moderation.  National choice of the formal 
institutional framework in which bargaining takes place today does appear to have observable 
effects on wage moderation and dispersion, but the institutional setup found in the immediate 
post-war era (which in many countries reflected the strength of organized labour and the 
importance of central government even earlier in the twentieth century) casts a large shadow on 
outcomes in the present day.   
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The entrance of government into wage bargaining is one of the major developments in global 
industrial relations in the last 65 years.  Differences in institutional frameworks and national 
policies regarding wage bargaining are often identified as a source of variation in wage structures 
between countries.  This paper seeks to achieve two aims: first, to bring a new methodological 
approach to the question at hand that provides robust evidence regarding the relationship 
between government involvement in bargaining arrangements and wage outcomes, and second, 
evaluate whether past institutions continue to shape bargaining outcomes in the present day.  We 
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find some support of our first hypothesis (H1) that tripartism and other forms of government 
intervention in the bargaining process have consistent, but modest effects on labour market 
outcomes.  Wage moderation is greater in the presence of tripartism, with workers accepting 
wage increases that are lower relative to productivity growth, as compared to states without 
government involvement in bargaining.  Wage dispersion is much less affected by tripartite 
bargaining, which suggests that the influence of government may have been primarily on overall 
wage levels, rather than targeting the pay of particular sectors.   
Historical bargaining arrangements, measured here as the degree of corporatism in 
national labour markets in the immediate post-war settlement between 1950 and 1960, appear to 
have larger effects than current institutions – a finding strongly in support of our second 
hypothesis (H2).  One explanation for this finding is that post-Second World War arrangements 
reflect labour market “culture” in the early twentieth century, something that is observed to some 
extent in terms of international differences in work time and work sharing over the long run.
42
 
Alternatively, one could argue that the Second World War served as a form of structural break in 
the national labour markets under consideration.  Subsequent changes in bargaining institutions 
matter on the margin, as our results indeed show, but expectations surrounding acceptable 
negotiated pay outcomes are strongly related to the institutional framework that operated when 
formal industrial relations first emerged as an important feature of many economies in the early 
1950s.   
What lessons do these findings carry for governments and policy makers in the present 
day?  The first one is: know your history.  Negotiated wage outcomes depend on the interaction 
of formal and informal institutions in the bargaining arena.  If informal institutions are strongly 
dependent on behaviour conditioned by significant changes in bargaining arrangements that 
20 
 
emerged circa 1950, then it is relatively unsurprising that reshaping bargaining arrangements 
today has a relatively small effect on the structure of pay.  The second lesson we would draw is 
that “critical junctures” 43 matter.  The Second World War was a major international shock that 
permitted the entrance of government into what were previously private labour markets both 
during and after the conflict.  The changes that occurred during that critical juncture continue to 
have ongoing ramifications for how workers are paid today, even in markets where governments 
have largely withdrawn from the formalities of bargaining.   
 
 
 
Notes 
1. Eichengreen and Iversen, “Institutions and Economic Performance”; Eichengreen and Vazquez, 
“Institutions and Economic Growth”. 
2. Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange argue that wage-setting remained centralised in much of Northern and 
Central Europe despite the institutional changes of the 1980s and 1990s. Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange, 
“Unions, Employers and Wage-Setting”. 
3. Calmfors and Driffil, “Bargaining Structure”; Nickell and Layard, “Labor Market Institutions”; 
Freeman, “Labor Market Institutions”; OECD, Employment Outlook, Chapter 3. For evidence on the 
connection between tripartite bargaining structures and the welfare state, see Siegel.  Siegel, 
“’Competitive Concertation’” 
4. Soskice, “Wage Determination”; Flanagan, “Macroeconomic Performance”. 
5. One exception is Wallerstein, who uses information on government involvement in his model of wage 
dispersion (defined using the tails of the wage distribution) reported in the OECD Employment Outlook. 
Wallerstein, “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay”. 
6. Hassel, “Politics of Social Pacts”; Visser, “Two Cheers for Corporatism”. 
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7. Wallerstein, “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay”. 
8. Traxler and Brandl, “Collective Bargaining”; Brandl, “Successful Wage Concentration”. 
9. Calmfors and Driffil, “Bargaining Structure”. 
10. Bruno and Sachs, Economics of Worldwide Stagflation; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 
Unemployment; Wallerstein, “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay”; OECD, Employment Outlook, Chapter 
3; Flanagan, “Macroeconomic Performance”. 
11. Calmfors and Driffil, “Bargaining Structure”. 
12. Soskice, “Wage Determination”. 
13. Calfmors and Driffil, “Bargaining Structure”; Baccaro and Simoni, “Organizational Determinants of 
Wage Moderation”. 
14. These concessions might include reduced taxes paid by employees, and union involvement in public 
policy through the operation of training and certification programmes.  Visser, “Two Cheers for 
Corporatism”; Hassel, “Politics of Social Pacts”. 
15. Hassel, “Politics of Social Pacts”.  Visser presents a related argument for the Netherlands; following 
major central accords in 1982 and 1993, bipartite negotiations took place with knowledge that 
government would be likely to return to the bargaining table should employment changes designed to 
achieve wage moderation stall. Visser, “Two Cheers for Corporatism”. See also Hassel for further 
discussion on how social pacts have been sustained in European economies.  Hassel, “Policies and Social 
Pacts”. 
16. Soskice, “Wage Determination”, 41. 
17. For example, German wage bargaining typically takes place within industries at the regional level, 
without national oversight.  Soskice, “Wage Determination”, 44. 
18. Wallerstein, “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay”. 
19. Brandl, “Successful Wage Concentration”. 
20. Flanagan, “Macroeconomic Performance”.  
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21. Maier, “Preconditions for Corporatism”. See Gerber on the impact of the First World War on the 
relative appeal of corporatism in the United States and the United Kingdom.  Gerber, “Corporatism in 
Comparative Perspective”. 
22. Panitch, “The Development of Corporatism”. 
23. See Alexopoulos and Cohen for more detail on the history of Swedish centralised bargaining.  
Alexopoulos and Cohen, “Centralised Wage Bargaining”. 
24. Acemoglu et al., “Institutional Causes”. 
25. Visser, “ICTWSS Database”. 
26. Baccaro and Simoni, “Centralized Wage Bargaining”; Visser, “Two Cheers for Corporatism”. 
27. Baccaro and Simoni, “Organizational Determinants of Wage Moderation”. 
28. A second database is available that includes sectoral data for a limited number of countries; we have 
not used this so far as we would lose much of the compelling variation in labour market institutions. 
29. Ideally we would use sector-based national income estimates here, but they are available over time 
only for a small set of countries, which do not include many of the states with the more interesting 
institutional histories. 
30. We have also tried alternatives such as the mean absolute deviation within each country year cell, or 
the ratio between “skilled” and “unskilled” sectors.  These approaches yield quantitatively similar results. 
31. The wage coordination in the Visser database is highly collinear with bargaining level, and analysis 
with that measure yields similar results. Visser, “ICTWSS Database”. 
32. Hemker, Sijtsma, and Molenaar, “Selection of Unidimensional Scales”; Mokken and Lewis, “A 
Nonparametric Approach”. 
33. Allard and Lindert, “Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs”. 
34. While we have converted all monthly, daily, and weekly salaries and wages into hourly form, there 
may be compensating differences associated with differences in contractual form, or other unobserved 
differences between pay period and earnings. 
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35. The Appendix outlines how we converted series with different currencies and contract form on the 
most consistent basis possible.  In exploratory regressions we included a series of controls for whether 
original pay was reported monthly, weekly, daily, or hourly, but these are statistically insignificant and 
their inclusion has little effect on the other coefficients.  We also experimented with controls for whether 
series were based on the wages of male workers, female workers, or a mix of the two; in the results that 
follow, we present findings based on the final set of series (it contained by far the most observations).  
Results are broadly similar in the gender-specific data, and we have also estimated models which pool the 
series and include series type controls, with little change on the overall results.   
36. Hausman and Taylor, “Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects”. 
37. Plümper and Troeger, “Efficient Estimation”. 
38. We have experimented with union density as an additional explanatory variable in alternative 
specification of this model.  It is at best an imperfect proxy for the importance of labour organizations on 
national bargaining structures, and is not available consistently for all countries in our analysis.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion or exclusion of this variable has little effect on other coefficients.  In 
additional regression we have interacted union density with bargaining institutions, but these interactions 
almost universally fall far short of statistical significance, and fail to add much of substance to the overall 
picture.  
39. Overall, the standard errors appear smaller compared with the RE ones because our HT estimator does 
not allow for robust standard errors.  As a robustness check we also estimated FEVD models and the 
results were similar to the HT results reported.  Because our sample size is quite large we chose to report 
the HT results given that the FEVD estimator is originally developed for small sample TSCS data. 
40. To address concerns about serial correlation in variables run all models estimated thus far on 
transformed data of five-year averages as we then have 8 periods in total; the results remain stable and 
very similar to the ones reported. 
41. Plümper and Troeger, “Efficient Estimation”. 
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42. Huberman and Minns, “’The Times They Are not Changin’”.  More broadly, our findings can be seen 
relevant to the debate on the link between tripartism and the varieties of capitalism theory.  For example, 
Regini, “Tripartite Concertation”.  The policy implication of such link is that ideas of designing or 
redesigning the institutions of European industrial relations should be considered with caution as found, 
for example, by Schroeder and Weinert in a related context.  Schroeder and Weinert, “Designing 
Institutions”. 
43. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail. 
44. Source at http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates-classic. 
45. US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.  
46. Allard and Lindert, “Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs”. 
47. Hausman and Taylor, “Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects”; Plümper and Troeger, 
“Efficient Estimation”. 
48. Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data. 
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Table 1. Wage and labour productivity summary statistics, by country 
 Real hourly 
wage 
Real 
output/hour 
Dispersion 
(s.d.) of 
sectoral 
wages 
Real wages/ 
productivity 
Years of 
wage data 
Australia 15.1 (1.2) 21.3 (4.0) 3.7 (.37) .70 (.06) 36 
Austria 14.4 (2.5) 19.5 (5.4) 3.3 (.93) .76 (.10) 40 
Belgium 16.4 (4.1) 26.0 (6.5) 3.2 (2.0) .63 (.08) 39 
Canada 21.5 (2.4) 22.5 (3.5) 4.7 (.96) .98 (.19) 40 
Denmark 18.3 (5.0) 22.8 (5.4) 1.8 (1.4) .81 (.08) 40 
Finland 12.2 (1.9) 19.0 (6.4) 2.1 (.55) .69 (.14) 40 
France 11.0 (2.8) 25.0 (6.8) 2.4 (1.1) .45 (.04) 40 
Great Britain 18.3 (2.9) 20.2 (5.7) 4.2 (1.3) .80 (.07) 29 
Germany 17.4 (3.5) 23.9 (5.6) 4.8 (.88) .75 (.19) 40 
Greece 7.8 (2.1) 11.5 (3.0) 3.8 (.75) .73 (.05) 40 
Ireland 13.0 (4.3) 17.1 (7.7) 2.9 (2.0) .83 (.18) 40 
Israel 11.8 (1.1) 20.5 (1.2) 3.8 (1.4) .57 (.02) 16 
Japan 14.4 (.55) 16.6 (5.1) 1.7 (.13) .66 (.03) 18 
Netherlands 20.5 (2.2) 24.8 (5.6) 3.4 (1.3) .85 (.14) 40 
Norway 18.1 (5.9) 25.3 (7.9) 2.1 (2.2) .68 (.10) 36 
New Zealand 12.5 (.81) 18.2 (1.6) 1.4 (.83) .69 (.04) 40 
Portugal 6.9 (.64) 12.1 (2.7) 2.3 (.25) .50 (.03) 22 
Singapore 7.5 (4.3) 12.4 (4.8) 2.3 (1.6) .54 (.10) 40 
Spain 13.8 (2.0) 17.8 (5.1) 3.8 (.72) .70 (.06) 34 
Switzerland 19.1 (5.8) 21.2 (2.7) 2.8 (2.0) .79 (.18) 38 
Sweden 13.0 (1.0) 22.3 (4.4) 1.9 (.59) .61 (.15) 40 
United States 20.7 (3.1) 28.2 (5.4) 4.7 (.61) .78 (.24) 40 
Notes: See text and Appendix for source details.  Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
are reported.   
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Table 2. Wage and labour productivity summary statistics, by institutional regime 
 Real 
hourly 
wage  
Real 
output/hour 
Real wages/ 
productivity 
Dispersion 
(s.d.) of 
sectoral 
wages 
National level wage bargaining 13.5 (4.3) 18.6 (6.5) .74 (.14) 2.4 (1.6) 
Industry and ‘local’ level wage 
bargaining 
15.4 (5.4) 22.1 (6.9) .71 (.18) 3.2 (1.7) 
Government imposed wages 14.7 (5.4) 17.3 (7.4) .76 (.19) 2.0 (1.7) 
Government in tripartite negotiations 11.7 (4.8) 17.7 (7.2) .66 (.13) 2.6 (1.5) 
Government has indirect or no 
involvement in bargaining 
15.9 (4.9) 21.6 (6.3) .73 (.18) 3.2 (1.7) 
Notes: See text for categories, and the Appendix and text for further source details.  Means and 
standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported.   
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Table 3. Bargaining regime and relative wages 
Variables OLS  
(1) 
FE  
(2) 
RE  
(3) 
HT  
(4) 
National level wage bargaining .023 
(.025) 
.011 
(.012) 
.011 
(.012) 
.011** 
(.005) 
Government imposed wages -.031 
(.022) 
-.001 
(.014) 
.001 
(.014) 
.001 
(.007) 
Tripartite negotiations -.068** 
(.028) 
-.033*** 
(.014) 
-.033*** 
(.014) 
-.033*** 
(.006) 
GDP/capita .006* 
(.003) 
-.005 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.006) 
-.005*** 
(.001) 
Constant .814*** 
(.047) 
.861*** 
(.064) 
.840*** 
(.072) 
.770*** 
(.061) 
Time trend Y Y Y Y 
Unit of pay controls Y Y Y Y 
Sector and country controls  Y Y Y 
R-square .12    
R-square within  .28 .27  
R-square between  .01 .71  
R-square overall  .13 .61  
rho    .68 
Number of observations 4906 4906 4906 4906 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.  All regressions are 
clustered by unit of observation and robust standard error estimator is applied.  Models are 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression models.  In the Hausman-Taylor (HT) model, bargaining states 
and GDP are treated as time-varying endogenous variables.  Level of significance is denoted as 
follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table 4. Bargaining regime and wage dispersion 
Variables OLS  
(1) 
FE  
(2) 
RE  
(3) 
HT  
(4) 
National level wage bargaining .220 
(.291) 
.479 
(.295) 
.480 
(.300) 
.480** 
(.228) 
Government imposed wages -.470* 
(.259) 
-.461** 
(.232) 
-.461** 
(.236) 
-.461*** 
(.151) 
Tripartite negotiations -.078 
(.266) 
-.210 
(.212) 
-.210 
(.216) 
-.210 
(.141) 
GDP/capita .082 
(.053) 
.148 
(.096) 
.148 
(.098) 
.148*** 
(.062) 
Constant 1.040 
(.780) 
-.144 
(.943) 
-.738 
(1.035) 
-.738** 
(.315) 
Time trend Y Y Y Y 
Unit of pay controls Y Y Y Y 
Country controls  Y Y Y 
R-square .34    
R-square within  .44 .44  
R-square between  .02 .99  
R-square overall  .26 .70  
rho    .00 
Number of observations 732 732 732 732 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. All regressions are 
clustered by unit of observation and robust standard error estimator is applied.  Models are 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression models.  In the Hausman-Taylor (HT) model, bargaining states 
and GDP are treated as time-varying endogenous variables.  Level of significance is denoted as 
follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.  
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Table 5. Bargaining regime and wage outcomes – historical and contemporary institutional 
effects 
Variable Wage moderation Wage dispersion 
(1) (2) 
National level wage bargaining (residuals) .013*** 
(.005) 
.469** 
(.230) 
Government imposed wages (residuals) .001 
(.006) 
-.480*** 
(.154) 
Tripartite negotiations (residuals) -.036*** 
(.005) 
-.203 
(.143) 
Historic wage coordination -.322*** 
(.136) 
-1.951*** 
(.665) 
GDP/capita -.017*** 
(.001) 
.128*** 
(.030) 
Constant 1.422*** 
(.223) 
-3.492*** 
(1.236) 
Time trend Y Y 
Unit of pay controls Y Y 
Sector controls Y  
Country controls Y Y 
rho .75 .00 
Number of observations 4496 674 
Notes: The Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is applied.  Coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are reported.  Models are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects 
(FE), Random Effects (RE), and Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression models.  Bargaining states 
and GDP are treated as time-varying endogenous variables.  Israel and Singapore are excluded 
from this regression model due to lack of historic data in Allard and Lindert (2006).  Level of 
significance is denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Appendix 1. Sources for institutional variables, wages, and other data 
 
Wage data 
Information on wages is drawn from the ILO’s LABORSTA database.  We began by extracting 
wage information from 1969 to 2008 (when available for those years, as discussed below) for the 
following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Great Britain, Germany (West then unified), Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.  Of this 
initial selection, we retain all earnings series that consist of actual earnings or wages paid – we 
leave aside pay measures derived from the scales of collective agreements, minimum wages or 
salaries, and the like.  In the next step, we convert all pay series into US dollar equivalents, using 
exchange rate data to convert from local currencies.
44
  The wage series are then converted to 
2000 dollars using similar information about historical US consumer price indices.
45
  A final 
conversion relates to units of pay, which were recorded as earnings or wages per hour, day, 
week, or month.  All series were converted to hourly in the work that follows.  Visual inspection 
of the surviving series suggested that wages for some series were implausibly high or low, 
regardless of adjustments made for currency or time worked.  Several series for Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Finland, and the United States were discarded.  All data for Italy 
was omitted due to the implausible wage numbers.  The final task was to gather the wage series 
by sector.  The indicators used by the ILO differ somewhat by survey methodology, but data was 
coded into the following groupings to the best of our ability: manufacturing, construction, trade, 
transportation, finance, community, primary, mining, energy, and “other”.   
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Institutional variables 
The institutional variables are drawn from the ICTWSS Database on Institutional Characteristics 
of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 Countries Between 
1960 and 2008.  The database was created by Jelle Visser in the Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) at the University of Amsterdam.  We use the most recently 
available version of the database, released on-line on May 3, 2011.  The variables we use from 
the ICTWSS database are the following: coordination of wage bargaining (WCOORD, 
1,2,3,4,5), government intervention in wage bargaining (GOVINT, 1,2,3,4,5), level at which 
wage bargaining takes place (LEVEL, 1,2,3,4,5), mandatory extension of collective agreements 
(EXT, 0,12), national minimum wage (NMW, 0,1,2), union density (UD, 0-100), adjusted 
bargaining coverage (ADJCOV, 0-100), and centralisation of wage bargaining (CENT, 0-100).  
The bargaining and government intervention variables were used to construct a series of dummy 
variables to capture different bargaining states.  Institutional measures from the 1950s are from 
Allard and Lindert’s coordination index, which we have rescaled from 0 to 2.46   
 
Other variables 
Labour productivity is from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.  It consists of GDP 
per hour, expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars.   
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Appendix 2: Estimation methodology  
The simplest strategy to estimate the models in equation (1) is using pooled OLS (ordinary least 
squares) regression.  However, OLS would produce results that do not correspond to the causal 
effects of bargaining regimes and country institutions on labour market outcomes if both 
bargaining regimes and country institutions are endogenous so that we may be capturing reverse 
causality or the effect of some omitted variables on both bargaining regimes and labour market 
outcomes.  If we treat the bargaining regime variables as exogenous and ignore the measurement 
error problem the coefficients on these variables will be typically biased upwards.  If the 
measurement error in bargaining regime variables is significant, their coefficients might be 
biased downward due to attenuation bias.  A related problem can arise if bargaining regime 
variables correspond only poorly to the desired concept.  Our Mokken’s nonparametric scaling 
analysis was intended to minimise this attenuation bias.  In robustness check analysis where we 
use 5-year averages of the time series we further address the measurement error problem and 
show, as we will discuss later, robustness of our results.  
The traditional technique to overcome the problems outlined above is to eliminate the 
individual effects in the sample by transforming the data into deviations from individual means.  
Unfortunately, the resulting within-groups or fixed effects (FE) estimator has two important 
defects: 1) all time-invariant variables are eliminated by the transformation, so that fixed effect 
(institutions) coefficients cannot be estimated, and 2) the within-groups estimator is not fully 
efficient since it ignores variation across countries (and industries).  Furthermore, the fixed 
effects soak up most of the explanatory power of the slowly changing variables.  The alternative 
to FE is the RE (random effects) model.  However, the RE model even though more efficient 
than the pooled OLS is also inconsistent and biased when regressors are correlated with (latent) 
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fixed effects.  Importantly, the second drawback of the FE model becomes very serious in the 
case of variables that have very little within variance such as the bargaining regime dummy set in 
our analysis that show much more variation across countries than over time.  This inefficiency 
leads to highly unreliable point estimates and may thus cause wrong inferences in the same way 
a biased estimator could.   
A reasonable compromise in these circumstances is offered by the Hausman-Taylor 
procedure and the FEVD (fixed effects vector decomposition) procedure of Plümper and 
Troeger.
47
  The Hausman-Taylor procedure estimates a RE model and relies on exogenous time-
varying variables as instruments for the endogenous time-varying variables and exogenous time-
invariant variables plus the means of the exogenous time-varying variables as instruments for the 
endogenous time-invariant variables.  The Hausman-Taylor procedure provides a consistent 
solution to the potentially severe problem of correlation between (latent) fixed effects and time-
invariant variables.  However, caution must be exercised in identifying instruments that are 
uncorrelated with the errors and the fixed effects and highly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  An important feature of the Hausman-Taylor procedure is that the non-correlation 
assumptions can be tested, so that the method need not rely on totally a priori assumptions.  
FEVD decomposes the latent FE into an unexplained part and a part explained by the time 
invariant or the rarely changing variables.  The procedure is similar to that suggested by Hsiao 
but applied to small sample TSCS data.
48
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Appendix Table A1. Level of wage bargaining and intensity of government involvement 1969-
2008 
 Level of wage 
bargaining 
(national 1; 
other 0) 
Government 
involvement 
(imposed 
wages 2; 
tripartism 1; 
other 0) 
Corporatism 
index 1950s 
(high 2; low 0) 
Australia .22 (.42) .35 (.53) 1.0 
Austria .35 (.48) .25 (.26) 2.0 
Belgium .46 (.50) 1.00 (.92) 1.0 
Canada .00 (.00) .15 (.53) .0 
Denmark .10 (.30) .35 (.77) 2.0 
Finland .75 (.44) .90 (.54) .5 
France .00 (.00) .15 (.53) 1.0 
Great Britain .10 (.30) .38 (.70) 1.5 
Germany .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 1.5 
Greece .62 (.49) .72 (.72) .0 
Ireland .72 (.45) .60 (.50) 1.0 
Israel .22 (.42) .15 (.43) - 
Japan .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 1.5 
Netherlands .50 (.51) .50 (.75) 2.0 
Norway .70 (.46) .52 (.72) 2.0 
New Zealand .48 (.50) .65 (.95) 1.5 
Portugal .12 (.33) .75 (.87) 2.0 
Singapore .00 (.00) 1.0 (.00) - 
Spain .15 (.36) .65 (.80) 2.0 
Switzerland .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 1.0 
Sweden .50 (.51) .10 (.30) 2.0 
United States .00 (.00) .10 (.44) .0 
Notes: See text and Appendix for source details.  The corporatism index is rescaled from 3-1 to 
2-0 range. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported.   
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Appendix Table A2: Auxiliary regressions for estimating residuals 
Dependent variable  Wage-productivity 
gap 
Wage dispersion 
(1) (2) 
Coefficient R
2 
Coefficient R
2 
National level wage bargaining  .144*** 
(.029) 
.14 .190** 
(.092) 
.05 
Government imposed wages .206*** 
(.073) 
.21 .157*** 
(.024) 
.22 
Tripartite negotiations  .193*** 
(.021) 
.27 .191*** 
(.066) 
.27 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by unit of observation and robust standard errors OLS 
estimator is applied. The sole explanatory variable in each regression is the historic index of 
wage coordination.  Level of significance is denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
 
